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Abstract—Privacy of the outsourced data is one of the major
challenge.Insecurity of the network environment and untrust-
worthiness of the service providers are obstacles of making
the database as a service.Collection and storage of personally
identifiable information is a major privacy concern.On-line public
databases and resources pose a significant risk to user privacy,
since a malicious database owner may monitor user queries and
infer useful information about the customer.The challenge in data
privacy is to share data with third-party and at the same time
securing the valuable information from unauthorized access and
use by third party.A Private Information Retrieval(PIR) scheme
allows a user to query database while hiding the identity of
the data retrieved.The naive solution for confidentiality is to en-
crypt data before outsourcing.Query execution,key management
and statistical inference are major challenges in this case.The
proposed system suggests a mechanism for secure storage and
retrieval of private data using the secret sharing technique.The
idea is to develop a mechanism to store private information with
a highly available storage provider which could be accessed from
anywhere using queries while hiding the actual data values from
the storage provider.The private information retrieval system is
implemented using Secure Multi-party Computation(SMC) tech-
nique which is based on secret sharing. Multi-party Computation
enable parties to compute some joint function over their private
inputs.The query results are obtained by performing a secure
computation on the shares owned by the different servers.
Keywords: Database,Data storage,private Information Re-
trieval,Query Processing, Shamir’s Secret Sharing,Secure
Multi-party Computation
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure storage of confidential data and their private retrieval
are major research challenges, when the data are outsourced
to a third party untrusted service provider.Private Information
Retrieval(PIR) allows clients to retrieve data from a database
server in a privacy-preserving manner.PIR schemes make
use of cryptographic protocols to safeguard the privacy of
database users. This allow clients to retrieve records from
public databases, while the identity of the retrieved records
is completely hidden from database owners. The major goal is
that the database server should be able to respond to client
queries without learning any information about the records
retrieved.
A trivial solution is to encrypt the database [18] using
cryptographic techniques.But for the query processing, the
entire database must be downloaded and queries must be issued
locally.The query execution over encrypted data is a major
research challenge.Most of the solutions are inefficient due
to the large query processing time and complexities involved
in key management. The use of encrypted database is clearly
information-theoretically secure and the server cannot learn
which record the client seeks, but the key management, time
consuming encryption decryption process, overhead in large
encrypted database downloading and the difficulties involved
in query processing make the scheme impractical.
Fragmentation is another solution for providing confiden-
tiality of the outsourced data [14].The data owner partitions
the tables horizontally or vertically and distribute them to
different servers.Encryption is unavoidable in this case also
because fragmentation cannot preserve the confidentiality of
a single attribute.Collusion between servers is also a security
issue.Agarwal et al [1] use secret sharing technique to provide
confidentiality.Their solution supports different type of queries
to run efficiently.But untrusted servers have prior knowledge
about data distribution or frequency.
The proposed system suggests a secret sharing method
for confidentiality in the outsourced data.A relation is split
into random shares and these shares are send to the dif-
ferent servers.This provides both reliability and security.The
threshold secret sharing scheme helps the data to be re-
trieved from k number of servers out of n servers where the
shares are stored.The random shares also provides information
theoretical security at the cost of additional storage space.
Query processing and searching is an issue here.An efficient
mechanism for searching and query processing is also sug-
gested in this paper.It needs interaction between client and
different servers.The servers will send the shares which are
the results of the query.The shares are then combined to form
the original data.Since the computations are performed on
shares, it provides a Secure Multi party Computation(SMC)
environment.
There are several situations in which mutually distrustful
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parties need to perform a joint computation without revealing
their inputs to each other. This happens, for example, during
auctions, voting, negotiations and business analytics. The prob-
lem is how to perform such a computation without revealing
the inputs.SMC[10] is the solution to such problems.It permits
a group of parties to jointly compute a function of their private
inputs while preserving privacy and correctness of input.Every
participant will get the result of computation without exposing
their input.SMC protocol was first introduced by Yao in
1982 by exploring the famous Millionaire’s problem[17]. The
protocol is secure, if no participant can learn more from
the description of the public function and the result of the
computation.
SMC is accomplished here by using Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. In secret sharing, the secret is not single handed, but
multi-handed so that even if any of the parties involved in the
computation are malicious, the secret can be reconstructed. A
verifiable secret sharing scheme is one in which parties can
verify the validity of the shares for consistency. To handle
malicious parties involved in any computation, the secret
sharing scheme needs to be verifiable.
Development of secret sharing scheme started as a solu-
tion to the problem of safeguarding cryptographic keys by
distributing the key among n participants and t or more of the
participants can recover it by pooling their shares. Thus the
authorized set is any subset of participants containing more
than t members.This scheme is denoted as (t, n) threshold
scheme[8]. The notion of a threshold secret sharing scheme
is independently proposed by Shamir[13] and Blakley[3] in
1979. Since then much work has been put into the investigation
of such schemes. Linear constructions were most efficient and
widely used. A threshold secret sharing scheme is called ideal,
if the share size is same as the secret size and is perfect, if less
than t shares give no information about the secret.Blakley’s
scheme is not perfect while Shamir’s scheme is perfect. Both
Blakley’s and the Shamir’s constructions realize t-out-of-n
threshold secret sharing scheme. However,their constructions
are fundamentally different.
Shamir’s scheme is based on polynomial interpolation over
a finite field. It uses the fact that we can construct a polynomial
of degree t− 1 only if t data points are given. A polynomial
f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i, with a0 is set to the secret value and the
coefficients a1 to at−1 are assigned random values in the field,
is used for secret sharing.The polynomial f(x) is evaluated
at n different points and each value is given as share to a
participant. That is , the value f(i) is given to the user i as
secret share.Here t is considered as threshold. When any t out
of n users join together they can reconstruct the polynomial
using Lagrange interpolation with t points and hence obtain the
secret a0. Any set of t− 1 users cannot gain any information
about the secret and is a perfect scheme. This scheme is easily
computable when necessary data is available and it avoids
single point of failure . Also it increases reliability, security,
safety and convenience [2].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.Related works
are given in section II.The proposed system and architecture
are mentioned in section III.Section IV contains an exam-
ple.Conclusions are drawn in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The PIR (Private Information Retrieval) was introduced
by Benny Chor [7] and has already received a lot of
attention[5][11][16][9] . The study of PIR is motivated by
growing concern about the user’s privacy when querying
a large commercial database . Protocols for PIR [7] and
Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)[12] provide
a limited type of privacy preserving search. In PIR the
server and clients are involved, where the server has a
database of n items and the client wants to obtain the item at
position i without the server learning the value of i. In the
case of SPIR, it is additionally required that the user does
not learn any information about other item except the one
that was requested. These protocols improved the general
multiparty computation and have sub-linear communication
and polynomial computational complexity.But still these
protocols remain inefficient for many practical uses and
support only simple selection, rather than general query
capability.
In database outsourcing, one party possess large amount
of data, but does not have enough storage at hand for the
reliable data storage.Many papers address the issues related
with database outsourcing [4][15][6].The major issue is that
we have to keep the data confidential from untrusted server
and it must be retrieved without revealing any info. The
approaches of [6][12] use encryption systems.The searching
over encrypted data is time consuming, which need the word
to be encrypted before searching.Thus the running time of
the search in these approaches is linear in the number of
all searchable tokens and the searching become inefficient
even though it provides better security. This pinpoints the
issue for trade off between efficiency and strong privacy
guarantees. Curtmola et al.[7] use the idea of inverted indices
for efficiency gain.They suggest preprocessing of the data by
the querier and compute inverted indices on search words. An
untrusted server can learn search pattern over multiple queries
in this case.
SMC based on homomorphic public-key encryption is also
proposed in [10],[11].In this each party distributes encryptions
of its private inputs to the other parties. The computations are
performed on this encrypted data. The homomorphic property
of encryption can be used to achieve a specific functional-
ity.Authorized set of users can do threshold decryption and
the final result can be obtained.
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposed system suggests a method of storing and
retrieving private data in a secure and effective manner. The
private data include personal information, sensitive information
or unique identification etc. The data storage may be a private
information storage using cloud database.
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A. Secure Data storage
The system does not use any encryption technique.Shares
corresponds to each relations are generated using Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme.These shares are then stored on different
servers. The architecture for data storage is shown in figure 1
Fig. 1. Architecture for Data storage
The architecture has four main modules
1) Database Owner
2) Share Generator
3) Database Hub
4) Database Servers
Database owner gives the table schema to Table schema
handler which is copied into all the database servers. When
a data is inserted, the data insertion module will give the data
into share generator module. The share generator converts the
data into a bytecode form using bytecode generator and then it
is divided into shares using shamir secret share generator.The
shares are then distributed and stored in different database
servers.
B. Algorithm for data storage
Step1: The database schema is copied into n database
servers
Step2: When an insert operation is performed, each attribute
value is divided into shares and stored in the database servers
DS1=R(A11,A21,A31,· · ·Am1)
DS2=R(A12,A22,A32,· · ·Am2)
DSn=R(A1n,A2n,A3n,· · ·Amn)
where, DSn is the nth database server
R(A1n,A2n,A3n,· · ·Amn) is the record containing attribute
shares of m attributes and Amn is the nth share of mth
attribute.
Step3:Along the attribute values a primary key column con-
taining index values starting from 1 will also be created
automatically.The purpose of this is to make the retrieval
process easy.
C. Secure Data Retrieval
The architecture for secure data retrieval is shown in
figure2
The main modules are
1) Client
2) Computation Server
3) Database Hub
4) Database Servers
Fig. 2. Architecture for Secure Data Retrieval
Step1:Client gives a query
Step2:The Query Handler parses the query and extract the
where condition attribute and passes it to Computation Agent
(CA)
Step3:CA request the shares of the condition attribute from
DB Server manager which forwards the request to all share
holding databases
Step4:After getting the attribute shares, CA reconstruct the
attribute values and check the condition and finds out the index
values of satisfying attributes
Step5:Query Handler gives the select attribute name and re-
quest the CA to get the shares corresponding to the index
values obtained in step 4
Step6:CA forwards a packet containing the following fields to
DB Manager and from there to database servers.
TABLE I
PACKET FORMAT
Indexvalue Select attribute name Client IP address
Step7:The DB servers send the requested attribute column
shares having the specified index values to the provided IP
address of client
Step8:The result constructor in the client reconstructs the
shares to retrieve the actual query result
IV. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
Consider a hospital database system which contains pa-
tient’s disease records. Since it is a large database, it is
outsourced in a cloud storage. The database contains sensitive
information so that the content of the database should not
be revealed to a third party. And also suppose the hospital
authority wants to know how many AIDS patients are there
keeping the anonymity of the patient. In this case, the hospital
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data is stored in 3 database servers in the form of shares and a
(2,3) scheme is used. Each database item is formed in to shares
using shamir’s secret sharing scheme and stored in different
servers having the same database schema.The database owner
stores the data in the form of shares and Database Server
Manager has the details of locations of database servers where
these shares are getting stored.
Consider the patient details table as shown in Table II. Each
TABLE II
PATIENT DETAILS TABLE
Patientid Patientname Doctorid Diagonosis
101 Ann 51 Aids
102 Bony 21 Cancer
103 Cara 51 Fever
104 Dona 26 Aids
attribute value is divided into 3 shares using shamir’s secret
sharing scheme and is getting stored in three database servers
as in Table III, Table IV, Table V respectively.
TABLE III
DATABASE SERVER I
Index Patientid Patientname Doctorid Diagonosis
1 189 1115 321 1111
2 168 479 743 931
3 236 2314 209 832
4 247 641 659 120
TABLE IV
DATABASE SERVER II
Index Patientid Patientname Doctorid Diagonosis
1 325 789 510 210
2 320 197 408 1245
3 543 980 201 911
4 468 319 877 319
TABLE V
DATABASE SERVER III
Index Patientid Patientname Doctorid Diagonosis
] 1 509 865 712 2354
2 558 107 501 123
3 1024 954 646 986
4 479 310 981 912
1) Client generates the query Select Patientname from pa-
tient details where Diagonosis=’Aids’.
2) The query is passed to Query Handler (QH) module.
QH extracts the where portion and take the attribute
Diagonosis and send to Computation Agent (CA)
3) CA forwards the attribute name to Database manager
4) Database Manager request the ’Diagonosis’ column val-
ues from any 2 database servers as per the threshold.
5) On getting the request each database server replies
by sending the shares of the requested attribute col-
umn(Diagonosis) to Database Manager.
6) Database manager forwards the shares to CA where CA
gets the Diagonosis column shares from any two of the
database servers as shown in Table VI
TABLE VI
SHARE FROM SERVERS
Diagonosis Diagonosis
1111 210
931 1245
832 911
120 319
7) CA applies langrange interpolation to reconstruct the
original values for Diagonosis field as shown in Table
VII
TABLE VII
AFTER RECONSTRUCTION
Diagonosis
Aids
Cancer
Fever
Aids
8) CA checks the where condition of the query, that is
diagonosis=’Aids’ and compute index values 1 and 4
which satisfies the condition
9) Query Analyser passes the select attribute name (patient-
name) to CA and CA forwards the packet containing
index values, select attribute name, client IP address to
Database Manager
10) Database Manager requests the share holding DB servers
to send the shares of attribute patientname in the speci-
fied indexes to the client IP address.
11) DB servers pass the shares to the specified IP address of
the client
12) The result constructor in the client receives all the three
shares of patientnames as in Table VIII
TABLE VIII
SHARES OF PATIENTNAME
Patientname Patientname
1115 789
641 319
13) After reconstruction, Client gets the result as in Table
IX
TABLE IX
RESULT OF QUERY
Patientname
Ann
Dona
V. CONCLUSION
PIR and secure storage and retrieval of data in untrusted
servers raise a major security challenge. We presented a secure
database storage and retrieval system based on secret sharing.
Since the data is stored as shares in databases, the knowledge
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of shares will not reveal any clue regarding the original data.
The query analysis and result reconstruction are performed in
the client side computation agent which ensures privacy pre-
serving query processing and computation.The system proves
to be efficient, secure and reliable. The work can be extended
with unstructured data. The coalition of the service providers to
retrieve the original data is a major security concern.A secret
vector which contains the values used to evaluate the secret
polynomial corresponds to each user can be used, which is
known only to the clients and hence provides added security
against untrusted service providers.Simple and efficient XOR
based secret sharing scheme can be used, if the number of
servers and threshold is small.
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